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We often behave in reprehensible ways, sometimes knowing that we can do better. 
But, a lot of times we do it without deciding or choosing to do so, even without 
thinking that we risk doing something wrong. We behave, in other words, 
negligently. Sometimes, specially if someone gets hurt, we get in trouble for it. 
Those who get hurt blame us; we feel guilty about it. Fortunately, if nothing 
catastrophic happens, we issue an apology and receive forgiveness in return. As 
far as social practices go, this seems to be a game with clear and easy to follow 
rules.   
 This chapter argues for the moral significance of negligence. As we shall see, 
negligence is not just a technical concept restricted to a narrow legal domain. Nor 
are attributions of it a marginal social and moral phenomenon. Negligence, in fact, 
is a test case for questioning assumptions central to widespread ways of theorizing 
about moral responsibility. It is also a window into everyday practices behind 
judgments of culpability, attributions of blame, and allocations of punishment.   
 I begin with a statement of what negligence is, a specification useful to see 
why it is morally significant. There are, as it will become evident, many ways in 
which negligence can occur. So, after defining negligence, I explore some of the 
existing variation. As we shall see, there is reason to doubt that a single approach 
can handle all cases of negligence. Less over-arching approaches are also found 
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problematic. In the end, I discuss an objection, skeptical of the moral significance of 
negligence, and offer a cautionary note signaling avenues for future work. 
 
1. Voluntarism  
 
Traditionally, the domain of moral responsibility has been seen—some theorists 
think it ought to be seen—as circumscribed by the voluntary.1 There are various 
ways of understanding what makes a piece of behavior voluntary, corresponding 
to how one thinks about the motivational and cognitive aspects of voluntary 
conduct. So, the view has been formulated in a variety of ways. A common 
formulation, however, emphasizes the presence of intentions as a central criterion 
for the attribution of responsibility. According to it, people are responsible only for 
their intentional actions (or omissions) and the intended or foreseen consequences of 
them (Zimmerman 1988; Levy 2014).  
Negligence occupies a middle ground between intentional and merely 
accidental wrongdoing. That’s why many theorists working on moral responsibility 
and blame have recently turned their attention to it.2 Being an example of 
																																																								
1  The view that the voluntary defines the domain of responsibility can be traced to 
Aristotle’s discussion in book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. But it is also held by 
contemporary theorists in a variety of forms. Besides the accounts couched in 
terms of intentional actions, there are accounts of it in terms choice (Duff 1993; 
Moore 1997: 548-592) and rational control (Wolff 1990; Fischer and Ravizza 1998). 
2  Among philosophers, much of the recent enthusiasm for negligence derives from 
George Sher’s (2006) provocative paper “Out of Control.” Since then, there has 
been a large amount of new work on negligence, way more than I can fairly 
reference here. Two recent volumes dedicated to the topic of culpable ignorance 
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wrongdoing that is not intentional or foreseen but that cannot be dismissed as 
merely accidental, it seems reasonable to hold people accountable and to blame 
them for it. Negligence, in other words, is a prima facie challenge to the voluntarist 
view.  
Going back to the mid 19th century, negligence has figured prominently in 
discussions within Anglo-American tort law.3 But this should not lead us into 
thinking that negligence is just a technical concept in the domain of institutionally 
sanctioned reparation. Negligence, in fact, is part of the machinery by which many 
adults carve their social world, attribute responsibility to each other, and think 
about the allocation of punishment (Shultz and Wright 1985; Nuñez et al 2014). 
Although voluntary wrongdoing might be the stereotypical target of attributions 
of responsibility, our everyday blaming practices clearly extend beyond the 
stereotype.  
This is something worth emphasizing. The traditional wisdom among 
developmental psychologists going back to Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1969) is 
that that the development of moral judgment is characterized by an increased shift 
from outcome to intent (for contemporary statements of the view, see Helwig et al 
																																																																																																																																																																									
are worth mentioning, Robinchaud and Wieland (2017) and Nelkin and Rickless 
(2007), as they present up-to-date versions of some positions developed over the 
last decade. An excellent survey of the philosophical intricacies of some of this 
discussion can be found in Rudy-Hiller (2018). In 2011, Criminal Law and Philosophy 
ran an issue dedicated to the legal aspects of negligence. For references, on the 
psychological investigation of judgment of negligence see below. 
3 The case that is said to introduce negligence as a distinctive tort is 1850’s Brown 
vs. Kendall, 60 (Mass) 292, where the reasonable man’s test makes one of its first 
appearance is US legal history.  
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2001, Zelazo et al 1996). Recent studies, however, have provided evidence showing 
that this might not be as radical a shift as it was previously hypothesized (Hamlyn 
et al 2007; Cushman et al 2013;). In particular, when stimuli are carefully controlled 
for intention salience and recency, young children seem to be more sensitive to 
intent than what they otherwise would seem to be (Nobes et al 2016, 2017).  
Negligence provides a complement to this story, but from the opposite end 
of the developmental spectrum. It is not just, as some psychologists have 
emphasized (Young et al 2007; Cushman 2008; Alicke 2014), that automatic 
evaluation by adults tends to be more outcome-focused, whereas controlled 
evaluation is more intent- driven. In addition, and perhaps even more interesting, 
what the study of negligence indicates is that even the considered and deliberate 
moral judgment of adults is not as reliant on intent as the traditional picture 
presupposes. Even though it is not primarily driven by outcome, when it comes to 
negligence, moral judgment it somewhat less psychologically involved.  
It might seem, at least when considered in the abstract, that these two 
issues—the success of our standing theories and the form of some current 
practices—are independent of each other. Even if negligence in the end proves 
voluntarism to be false, it is still an open question whether, say, negligent agents in 
the real world are blamed for the right reasons or should be punished in 
accordance with lay attitudes. Still, unless these reasons and attitudes are 
independently found problematic, their prevalence does serve to underscore the 
challenge outlined here. At least, it suggests that the challenge raised to 
voluntarism goes beyond the zero-sum game of building theories and offering 
counter-examples to it. Understanding to what extent and why it is reasonable to 
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hold negligent people accountable is part of understanding the moral legitimacy of 
some of our current social practices. 
 
2. Fixing the reference 
 
Negligence, as said above, differs from intentional and merely accidental 
wrongdoing. To a first approximation, the contrast goes something like this. A 
person can behave negligently by intentionally doing many things. But, in so far as 
her behavior is truly negligent, the wrongdoing should not be viewed as 
intentional or as foreseen. At least, it should not be viewed as intentional or 
foreseen under the description in which it is also wrong. The negligent agent, in 
other words, does not act intending to do wrong, nor does she intentionally or 
knowingly do wrong for the sake of anything else.  
A person’s behavior, on the other hand, can fall below some acceptable 
moral standard due to its unintended and unforeseen consequences. The 
consequences might have been easily preventable, even by the person herself. All 
of this, however, is compatible with the episode being a mere accident (say, a 
product of bad luck) and the person not being culpable for it. Negligence, in other 
words, does not just imply getting things wrong, where there was the option of 
getting them right. It requires, in addition, the presence of a mistake.  
To sharpen the contrast, consider the following hypothetical scenario: 
Cooking. Annie invites a friend to come over for lunch on Sunday. He 
accepts but warns her about his peanut allergy. Annie figures making her 
pesto recipe would probably be a bad idea, so she decides instead to make 
chicken. On Sunday, running behind schedule, Annie fries the chicken using 
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some left over peanut oil, which she finds in her kitchen. Sure enough, 
shortly after the friend starts eating he has an allergic reaction to it.  
(Adapted from Nuñez et al 2014, study 3) 
 
Many people would find Annie responsible for the allergic reaction of her friend 
and would blame her for it (Nuñez et al 2014). But there are different ways of 
understanding the story. And not all of them are instances of negligence, at least in 
the sense in which negligence is meant to create trouble for voluntarism.   
It is possible, for example, to imagine the scenario as one in which Annie 
makes a reckless decision, as opposed to a negligent one. On Sunday, she remembers 
her friend’s allergy, she knows the oil contains peanuts, but is desperate to have 
lunch served in time. So, even though she does not intend to harm her friend, she 
goes ahead and cooks with the peanut oil she has in hand. Annie simply hopes her 
friend won’t be harmed by it.  
The story can also be expanded in ways where the harms occur due the 
agent’s excusable ignorance. Suppose, for instance, that Annie used the oil without 
knowing that it was peanut oil. Unbeknownst to her, her roommate had by 
mistake refilled the olive oil container with peanut oil a few days before. Then, 
even though the harm could have easily been avoided (Annie could have not used 
the oil, she could have checked before using it, etc.), it does not seem that Annie 
acted out of negligence.  
These variations of the story are compatible with the truth of voluntarism. 
Reckless Annie might not do wrong on purpose, but she knowingly risks doing it. 
Ignorant Annie, on the other hand, might have informed herself better. But, in so 
far as there is no reason for her to suspect that she was misinformed, her lack of 
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knowledge seems not to result from her own fault. As we shall see, some usages of 
the term “negligence” count reckless decisions as instances of it. But, for the 
discussion in this chapter, we shall not be concerned with these sorts of cases. We 
shall restrict ourselves to instances of what might be called, perhaps redundantly, 
inadvertent negligence.  
Yet, even this restricted sense, negligence can occur in multiple forms. 
Annie, for instance, might have negligently decided to use peanut oil, say, if she 
didn’t remember her friend’s allergy when she started cooking on Sunday. 
Alternatively, she might have negligently failed to realize that being allergic to 
peanuts meant being allergic to peanut oil. The issue of the allergy did occur to her 
but she simply didn’t connect the dots. Finally, Annie might have negligently 
omitted checking whether the oil contained peanuts, which she should had, given 
that her roommate had several times in in the past refilled the container with 
peanut oil.  
No doubt, these variations of the story differ from each other in important 
ways. For instance, in the first and second version of it, the negligent agent makes 
a bad decision. The last one, by contrast, does not involve making a decision at all. 
It is, instead, a pure omission. Likewise, whereas the second version of the story 
involves a mistake regarding the truth of Annie’s beliefs, the mistake in the first 
and third version seems to be located elsewhere: respectively, a failure to 
remember certain things already believed and a failure to seek relevant 
information.  
For the moment, however, we can put these differences aside and focus on 
the superficial shape shared by all of them. The negligent person has enough 
information to act in line with certain moral standards or, at least, has easy access 
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to information that would allow her to do so. But because she fails to advert to that 
information or to the need to seek it, she winds up acting below those standards. 
What she does, therefore, is not a reflection of what she intends or how willing she 
is to do or to risk doing things with potentially bad consequences. It is a rather a 
reflection of her failure to see her actions (or her omissions) in the light of some 
available information at the time.  
With this, we can now explain more generally the challenge that negligence 
raises. Voluntarists of all stripes conceive of culpability in terms of what might be 
labeled a guilty mind. The culpable agent, on their view, need not act out of malice, 
that is, motivated to do wrong as such. Her intentions need not be, in and of itself, 
morally censurable. Yet, at a minimum, she must have been motivated to do what 
she did in its wrongful guise. That is, she must have regarded the action, maybe 
not as wrong, but at least as having the characteristics that ultimately make it 
wrong.4   
In cases of negligence, however, this wrongful characterization is absent 
from the agent’s mind. This is what the failure of advertence comes to. The 
negligent person seems to be at fault for the wrong she did. But at the time she 
																																																								
4 A succinct way of putting this perspective on culpability is offered by Haji (1997: 
526): “Blameworthiness is affiliated not with the objective wrongness of an action 
but with whether a person takes herself to be doing wrong in performing an 
action.” See also Duff (1993) and Moore and Hurd (2011: 150). Another way of 
casting the view of culpability as a guilty mind is in terms of the person’s having a 
deficient quality of will. The way traces back to Kant, who thought the will of a 
person was both the locus of her moral worth and her moral appraisal. For a 
contemporary formulation of the view of culpability as bad quality of will view, 
see Mckenna (2011). 
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does not see her behavior as having the features that made it the instance of 
wrongdoing that it turned to be. Hence, if she is indeed culpable, her culpability 





Legal scholars commonly define negligence in terms of a failure of due care or 
diligence. This actually follows the definition of the term as established in the Moral 
Penal Code (Owen 2007; Raz 2010, Shiffrin 2017). The central idea behind it is that 
people have a general obligation to behave with enough care, so as not to harm 
others or risk harming them without any reasonable justification. Negligence is 
constituted by a breach of this obligation. The negligent agent harms or risks 
harming someone because she fails to exercise the care expected from her. Her 
inadvertence is supposed to be the psychological manifestation of this failure. 
It is easy to see how this general duty to care works when institutionalized 
relationships are involved. Parents, for instance, are under the duty to look after 
the wellbeing of their offspring and to make well-informed decisions when it comes 
to them. It is no surprise, therefore, that illustrations of negligence in the law often 
involve cases of poor parental decisions. It is no surprise either that real-life cases 
of parental negligence more often than not result in convictions (Collins 2006).  
It might be harder to see how this kind of general duty works when there is 
no special relation between the agent and her potential victims. But it is still 
plausible to think that this deontic framework applies here too (see Owen 2007 and 
for discussion). Even if there is no codified duty to care for pedestrians or other 
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drivers in the road, one is under the obligation to drive carefully. In general, the 
absence of a specific duty to care for others is compatible with the existence of a 
duty to avoid carelessness when performing certain risky activities.  
Now, as mentioned earlier, the concept of negligence is not proprietary to 
civil or criminal courts—or to philosophical discussions concerning moral 
responsibility, for that matter. Not only do people in everyday life seem to respond 
negatively to negligent behaviors and to treat them as legitimate targets for 
attributions of culpability and grounds for punishment. But they also seem to have 
some sort of explicit mastery of the concept. This has, in fact, led some scholars to 
insist that the legal category of negligence is borrowed from popular morality, 
although that is probably more a theoretical speculation than a hypothesis with 
any evidential support.5 
At any rate, empirical work concerning everyday conceptions of negligence 
does suggest that some of the deontic structure found in the law can be also found 
within the folk conception of negligence. Participants in these studies often 
contrast negligent with intended and desired behavior (Shultz and Wright 1985; 
Nuñez et al 2014, Laurent 2016, study 3). When freely asked to define negligence, a 
prevalent response is that negligent behavior is careless or a sign that the agent 
fails to take reasonable care (Nuñez et al 2014, study 2). Attributions of negligence 
																																																								
5 A statement of this position, which is intended as common knowledge among 
legal theorists, can be found in Raz (2010: 5). The view that many legal distinctions 
and principles are just codifications of common-sense morality has a long tradition 
among psychologists. See, for instance, Hamilton (1978) and Fincham and Jaspers 
(1980).  
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are sensitive to the lack of precautions surrounding the act (Karlovac and Darley 
1988).  
Most of these studies, unfortunately, have presupposed too broad an 
understanding of what negligence is. So, some of its conclusions need to be taken 
with a grain of salt. Some of the landmark studies, for instance, ask participants to 
rate the culpability of an actor for “negligent” wrongdoing without explicitly 
defining the term. But the scenarios evaluated lack enough detail to rule out the 
possibility of the actor being recklessness, as opposed to negligent (Shultz and 
Wright 1985; Nuñez et al 2014, study 3). Others studies provide participants with 
definitions of “negligence” and ask them to rate an actor along that dimension. But 
sometimes the definitions provided are compatible with conscious wrongdoing 
(Nuñez et al 2014, study 1; Laurent et al 2016, study 1) or, to make matters worse, 
they explicitly include the possibility of deliberate wrongdoing (Karlovac and 
Darley 1988). 
Of course, it is possible that lay people are not sensitive to these distinctions. 
Or perhaps, they do not mark the difference with the terminology that is standard 
among legal scholars and philosophers. 6 But this is not something that the existing 
studies demonstrate, as opposed to something that they presuppose. The truth is 
																																																								
6 It is possible, of course, that the distinction between negligence and recklessness is 
too fuzzy to serve certain kinds of purposes. For arguments that seek to 
demonstrate that the distinction is legally unstable, see Simmons (2009) and Husak 
(2011). 
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that at present, we do not have enough evidence to determine what are the exact 




Voluntarism restricts the domain of morally responsibility to voluntary 
wrongdoing. Here, we have defined the voluntary in terms of our intentional 
actions (or omissions) and their foreseen consequences. But that is obviously only 
one way, among others, of characterizing it. Alternatively, the voluntary could be 
defined by appeal to choice, rational control, or other similar notions, as long as 
these provide motivational and cognitive analogs of intent. 
There are, as Annie’s story illustrates, various ways in which people can 
behave wrongly, where their wrongdoing is not intentional or foreseen, and yet 
their transgressions cannot be discounted as faultless accidents. To the extent that 
																																																								
7 It does not help in this regard that a lot of empirical data about conceptions and 
attitudes towards negligence is buried under studyies that purport to be about 
other things. Lagnado and Channon (2008), for instance, study unintended 
forseeability evlautions with respect to unintended wrongdoing. Their materials 
are mixbag of negligence stories vs. stores of mere accidental wrongdoing. 
Cushman (2008) discusses some of his results, as concerning the moral evaluation 
with regard to accidents, but some of the vignettes he uses clearly involve 
negligent conduct. Young at el (2010) present their study as one about moral luck, 
when in reality it concerns the effects of belief evaluation in some forms of 
negligent behavior. This is meant not a criticism of their results, but as an 
indication of how much data about folk conceptions of negligence there could be 
that we haven’t properly thought about because it hasn’t been properly filed and 
categorized.    
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these cases involve some distinct forms of inadvertent wrongdoing, the relevant 
lessons drawn from them apply mutatis mutandi to other ways of defining the 
voluntary. Episodes of negligence, once one starts thinking about them, also 
problematize accounts of responsibility in terms of choice, rational control, etc.  
As intimated above, the problem for voluntarism lies with widespread 
attitudes towards negligence. In particular, negligent agents are not just regularly 
considered distracted, ignorant, careless, etc. That is, these negative attitudes 
cannot be understood merely as aretaic evaluations. Nor can they be interpreted 
just as expressions of frustration, or disappointment, although negligent 
wrongdoing is, no doubt, at times frustrating and disappointing. At least in some 
cases of negligence, agents are actually judged to be culpable for what they did.  
Legal precedent, in so far as it reflects our practices of moral evaluation, is 
telling in this regard.8 And so are our everyday spontaneous responses to episodes 
of negligence. Perhaps, if Annie genuinely acted negligently, her friend might not 
be angry with her. But he would probably think that his allergic reaction was her 
fault. He would expect her to feel bad about it. And he might even think that she 
merit some kind of social sanction. The same would be true about Annie herself. 
She would probably regret the whole thing, feel guilty about it, and be wiling to do 
some things to earn forgiveness. That is, both Annie and her friend would have 
had the kind of reactions that are best explained in terms of a judgment of 
culpability.  																																																								
8 Some legal theorists have argued that negligence should disappear as a category 
of culpability (Moore and Hurd 2011, Alexander and Kessler Ferzan 2009, 
Finkelstein 2005). But these theorists are obviously endorsing a revisionary 
position. 
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This is not just something that anecdotal evidence suggests. The scientific 
probing of attitudes in studies where participants are presented with negligence 
scenarios also provides evidence for it. Typically, in these studies actors are found 
morally responsible for their wrongdoing, less responsible than for voluntary 
offenses but responsible nevertheless (Shultz and Wright 1985). They are 
considered blameworthy or guilty for the harms inflicted (Kneer and Machery 
2018; Murray et al 2018); in fact, they are considered blameworthy also when no 
harms ensue (Young et al 2010). Lastly, for offenses of varying degrees of 
seriousness actors are found deserving of punishment, even obligated to pay 
restitution (Karlovac and Darley 1988, Laurent et al 2016), 
Judging by these reactions, it is clear that voluntarism does not offer a 
realistic description of our existing practices of attribution of culpability. People are 
indeed held responsible for the their voluntary behaviors, but not only for them. 
This lack of alignment between theory and practice can be interpreted in different 
ways. It might give us a reason to revise the practice in the light of the theory, that 
is, to regiment our common attitudes towards negligence in accordance to it. 
Alternatively, it could be grounds for making amendments in the theory, 
superficial or deep, depending on how big one thinks the negligence challenge is.  
Most philosophers working on negligence have argued that these practices 
ought to be vindicated. So, they agree that some degree of revision is appropriate in 
this respect. Voluntarism, as far as they are concerned, does not just fail to provide 
an accurate description of some current practices. It is normatively inaccurate as 
well. There are, in short, moral reasons for expanding the domain of responsibility 
beyond the voluntary to include in it the kind of inadvertent wrongdoing that is 
constitutive of negligence.  
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Two types of considerations have been prevalent in this regard. There are, 
first, considerations of fairness (Amaya and Doris 2015; Clarke 2014; ch. 7; Raz 
2010). In brief, in so far as agents have a fair opportunity to behave well, it would 
seem appropriate to judge them culpable for not behaving as they should, even if 
they do wrong inadvertently. There are, on the other hand, considerations having 
to do with our moral cultivation (Pereboom 2015; Vargas forthcoming). If part of the 
rationale of holding each other responsible for certain forms of wrongdoing is that 
this encourages and helps sustain certain forms of moral agency, then it would 
seem reasonable to include negligent wrongdoers within the scope of these 
practices.9  
Obviously, one thing is to argue that negligence is morally appropriate 
grounds of culpability. It is another to say what grounds the culpability of the agent 
in these cases. The latter is a much harder enterprise.  It is not easy to see what 
could replace the account of culpability in terms of a guilty mind, which ultimately 
underwrites voluntarism. Culpability, after all, is something that attaches to a 
moral agent, not to an act. And a moral agent, it would seem, is hardly dissociable 
from the moral contents of her mind.  
   
5. Competence vs. performance 																																																								
9 Both of these considerations admit of a sharper formulation. The negligent actor, 
to take the point about cultivation as an illustration, is by definition not aware that 
she is being careless at the time. So, the general injunction to be careful codified in 
our adverse attitude toward negligence will be an unlikely guide then and there 
(Alexander and Kessler Ferrzan 2009: p. 273-274). If it ultimately shapes her 
behavior, it is probably by introducing changes in her general routines and habits 
so as to avoid possible episodes of negligence.       
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Negligence is a thin notion. It is a determinable that obtains in many different 
determinate ways (Tappolet 2004). This is, in fact, one of the reasons why it is so 
hard to provide a satisfactory account of it. Most current proposals serve to explain 
why some negligent agents are appropriately held culpable but they leave 
unexplained significant swaths of negligent behavior. In other words, they manage 
to account for (some episodes of) negligence at the cost of making the phenomenon 
less morally pervasive.  
One dimension of variation, already mentioned above, concerns the type of 
inadvertence exhibited by the agent. Here, at least two broad possibilities can be 
distinguished. Some negligent agents inadvertently do wrong because at the time 
they fail to know or to believe certain things that they should. Others know and 
believe what they should but they fail to bring it to mind, so they inadvertently 
wind up behaving contrary to it. In other words, whereas some negligent agents 
should have known better, others actually know better.  
 In so far as both are forms of negligence, each involves some sort of epistemic 
shortcoming. The person, after all, acts failing to see that her actions (or omissions) 
are wrong. Still, there is an important psychological difference among them. Some 
negligent mistakes impugn the agent’s moral competence. Obviously, they do not 
put into question the person’s ability to perform the type of action that would 
allow her to discharge her obligations. But they put into question her capacity to 
appreciate that a certain moral standard applies in general, or in the particular 
circumstances she occupies.  
Other mistakes, by contrast, are simple failures to exercise that competence. 
They are, in other words, pure performance mistakes. The person, at the time, does 
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not have a moral impairment preventing her to see what the right course of action 
is. Instead, she fails to see that she is doing wrong because some of her knowledge 
or beliefs fail to become active in her mind. In consequence, they do not alert her 
that a certain course of action needs to be taken or that a course of action already 
chosen is somehow morally inappropriate. 10    
The difference is, perhaps, best brought to light by considering what would 
remedy in each case the person’s epistemic shortcoming. In one type of case, 
remedying it would require providing her with information she does not have at 
the time, say, information about the moral obligations that apply to her, the 
unforeseen consequences of her actions, or the moral significance of them in the 
context of action she occupies. In the other, it would simply be a matter of pointing 
at information that she already has. To behave well, one would not have to modify 
the contents of her mind but make them available to her at the time. 
This psychological distinction marks an important moral difference. It is one 
thing to hold someone accountable for violating a moral standard, while her 
competence to meet that standard is admittedly compromised. That would seem to 
run against the considerations of fairness mentioned earlier. 11 But it is an altogether 
																																																								
10  The distinction between errors due to a lack of competence and pure 
performance errors is familiar from psycholinguistics, since Chomsky (1964; 1965) 
introduced it to criticize behaviorist approaches to linguistic cognition. But clearly 
the difference is not restricted to our linguistic performances; it is applicable to any 
domain where some form of knowledge (tacit or explicit) needs to be implemented 
under conditions of limitation and time pressure. For discussion of how the 
distinction works in the moral domain, see Amaya and Doris (2015) for discussion.  
11 Zimmerman (1997) and Rosen (2004) both make the point in terms of false beliefs: 
it is unreasonable to expect that a person will behave contrary to what she believes. 
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different thing if her negligence is purely due to a performance mistake. For there, 
by definition, the person has intact the competence to behave well, so she can serve 
as the standard for her own evaluation. Given what she knew or believed at the 
time, she should have definitely acted otherwise.  
Negligence theorists focusing on performance mistakes have accordingly 
favored “capacitarian” approaches (Clarke 2014; Murray 2017; Rudy-Hiller 2017). 
On their view, culpability need not be grounded on voluntariness or, more 
broadly, on the agent having a guilty mind. It could alternatively be grounded on 
the person having the capacity to behave as she should, where the capacity is a 
matter of her intrinsic abilities and the environment cooperating with her.12  In 
essence, to the extent that the negligent agent is competent enough at the time of 
her mistake, it is fair to hold her responsible for it. It does not matter that she was 
not aware at the time of the wrongness of what she was doing.   
In so far certain forms ignorance undermine a person’s moral competence, it 
is clear this kind of appeal to capacity will not work for them, at least not without 
some serious modification. Instead, for these cases, theorists have often invoked 
																																																																																																																																																																									
But the point can also be made about agents who simply lack the relevant beliefs: 
how can someone be expected to act as she should, if she does not know what she 
should do? 
12 The capacitarian approach can be read in two different ways, a weak and a strong 
way, although these two readings are not always clearly distinguished. One could 
think that capacity is, alongside with others, a sufficient condition for moral 
responsibility (see Clarke 2014: 167). Alternatively, one could think that capacity or 
fair opportunity is what grounds moral responsibility in general, whether this 
applies to voluntary or involuntary wrongdoing (see, for instance, Brink and 
Nelkin 2013). 
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tracing strategies.13 The general idea here is that culpability in this sort of case is 
derivative, as opposed to basic. Perhaps, at the time the agent was not competent 
enough to act as she should have. Yet, if her incompetence traces back to a moment 
in time where she had enough information to anticipate the mistake, things 
arguably look quite differently. The culpability for the wrongdoing could depend in 
that case on the culpability of the prior act. 
Traditionally, tracing strategies have followed the spirit, if not the letter, of 
voluntarism. For them, the culpability of ignorant wrongdoing can be traced to a 
benighting intentional act: a prior moment in which an agent intentionally or 
knowingly let pass the opportunity of improving her cognitive position or in 
which she made a decision that actually impaired it. Tracing theorists, in other 
words, substitute the requirement of the agent’s mind being guilty at the time with 
the requirement of her ignorance resulting from the agent’s prior guilty mind.  
It is doubtful, however, that this strategy works as an account of negligence. 
To begin, it is unclear to what extent paradigmatic instances of negligence are in 
fact preceded by a benighting act, as the theory requires (for discussion see Vargas 
2005, Smith 2011). As critics have pointed out, in some of these cases, the agent’s 
actual ignorance is simply not traceable to an earlier decision made by her. When it 
																																																								
13 Seminal discussions of tracing strategies can be found in Fischer and Ravizza 
(1994) and Zimmerman (1986, 1997). But see also Rosen (2004), Levy (2009). Here I 
discuss voluntarist-friendly varieties of tracing, but there non-voluntarist versions 
of it in Fitzpatrick (2008), Shabo (2015), and Nelkin and Rickless (2017b). Tracing is, 
obviously, not the only way of accounting for this sort culpable ignorance. Talbert 
(2013) and Harman (2017) offer attributionist accounts of the sort that I discuss 
below. 
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is traceable, the earlier decision often does not seem culpable (But see Fischer and 
Tognazzini 2009 and Timpe 2011 for a rejoinder). 
More significant, perhaps, it is unclear whether tracing actually gives an 
account of culpable negligence, as opposed to merely dispensing with it. For it seems 
that what these proposals ultimately do is to deal with certain cases of negligence 
by reducing them to cases of direct responsibility for recklessness (Agule 2016; King 
2017). In the resulting account, the agent’s culpability is just the culpability of 
having knowingly taken some unjustified risks, in particular the risk of landing in 
a suboptimal epistemic position. Given that, holding the agent culpable for what 
she did afterwards seems moot. Her acting out of ignorance later seems not to add 
anything. 
 
6. Moral vs. factual 
 
A second dimension of variation concerns the type of information to which the 
agent fails to advert and on account of which she is said to be negligent. Here, there 
would seem to be two major dividing lines too. The agent, to put it briefly, could 
fail to see that some moral obligation applies to her. Alternatively, she could fail to 
see some relevant aspects of what she is doing, the circumstances she occupies, or 
the consequences of her actions given those circumstances.  
 The distinction is sometimes drawn as cases that involve neglect of some 
moral principle vs. those involving neglect of factual information.14 But drawing the 
contrast in these terms is a bit tendentious. This is not just because moral 
																																																								
14 See, for instance, Rosen (2004), Guerrero (2017), Wieland (2017: 2). 
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principles, one could argue, are grounded on factual claims—at least, many ethical 
realists have argue that this is so. But because it runs the risk of obfuscating one 
interesting way in which many negligence cases can be plausibly analyzed.   
To see this in more detail, consider the following case: 
Bathing. John is at home giving his 2-year old daughter a bath. He fills the 
bath, while her daughter stands near the tub. The phone rings in the next 
room. John tells her daughter to stand near the tub while he answers the 
phone. John believes her daughter will stand near the tub for a few minutes 
and wait for him to return. When he returns, his daughter is in the tub, 
dead, face down in the water. 
(Slightly modified from Kneer and Machery 2018) 
 
Many people would find John culpable for what he did (Kneer and Machery 
2018).15 It was, we can agree, a matter of bad luck that the child got into the tub 
instead of waiting for her dad. But deciding to leave the child alone next to it was a 
negligent mistake. Admittedly, John didn’t think that doing it would put his 
daughter under the risk of drowning. But definitely he should have thought about it.  
It would seem, thus described, that John’s inadvertence concerns a factual 
matter: the likelihood of his decision having a certain outcome. But this is not the 
only way of describing what John should have considered then. There is at least an 
alternative description of the case where John’s neglect does not concern the 
factual aspects of his situation, a description that still falls short of making a moral 																																																								
15 Different variations of the case have been discussed among negligence theorists 
(see, for instance, Alexander and Ferzan 2009; Husak 2011).  For present purposes, 
we can stipulate that the case involves a negligent (not a reckless) decision, which 
is not necessarily due to a memory failure. The parent’s mistake occurs at the time 
she decides to leave the child next to the tub. 
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principle the object of his neglect. To wit, John should have realized that children 
ought not to be left alone next to a bathing tub.    
Superficially, the two readings, the factual and the one just proposed, come 
down to the same thing.16 However the case is described, it is true that John did not 
anticipate that the child could drown; given the outcome, probably he should have. 
But as an account of what makes him negligent there is a significant difference 
between the two. In one reading, John is made negligent by his failure to foresee the 
consequences of his decision. In the other, what makes him negligent is his failure 
to appreciate a well-known rule for taking good care of a child. 
The rule, it is worth emphasizing, is not a moral principle. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with leaving a child next to a tub filled with water, as there is, 
say, in breaching the obligation not to kill or not to lie. In fact, there is nothing 
wrong at all with breaching the rule, as long as enough precautions are taken to 
avoid bad consequences from ensuing. Like other similar rules, this is just a maxim 
useful for codifying some of the practical obligations that follow from a general 
moral principle—in this case, the principle is that parents ought to care for their 
children. In and of itself, there is nothing “moral” about its content. 
																																																								
16 Legal scholars often distinguish between two customary tests of negligence (For 
discussion, see Hurd and Moore (2002) and Owen 2007)).  First, there is the well-
known foreseeability test: was the harm foreseeable to the defendant when she 
acted? There is also the lesser-known harm-within-risk test: was the harm of the 
type that motivated the prohibition of the defendant’s conduct? This second test is 
akin to the analysis proposed here, although to be strict the HWR test is often 
viewed as a test for proximate causation, which is only one of the components of 
the negligence tort.  
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Among negligence theorists, at least when it comes to cases of this sort, the 
foreseeability approach has been almost ubiquitous. Actually, because the likelihood 
of the bad consequences of a decision might be offset by its positive consequences, 
this approach ultimately views the culpability of the agent as residing in her 
departure from a standard of risk calculation (Feinberg 1987: 190ff; Timpe 2011). 
Here a common analysis is the reasonable person test, according to which the 
standard of risk calculation is fixed in relation to what a reasonable person would 
do in an analogue situation.    
As common as it is, this approach is hostage to a series of interrelated 
normative objections. It is not clear who the reasonable person is supposed to be. 
Even if it were, it is not clear why moral agents should be held to this standard. 
Intuitively, being poor at making risk calculations might be less than ideal; it might 
be a sign that one has some cognitive shortcoming, But it does not seem to be 
something that makes one deserving of moral blame (for detailed criticisms of this 
test, see Hurd and Moore 2002; Alexander and Ferran 2009; Sher 2009). 
There are, in addition, psychological reasons to doubt applications of the test, 
as a way of determining whether someone else is culpable for not adverting to the 
risk she was creating. Even if the normative objections can be handled, it seems 
that people are consistently poor in estimating the foreseeability of a certain 
outcome obtaining. People, in short, are often prone to exhibit a hindsight bias: 
knowing that the outcome obtained has a clear effect in their estimations of the 
probability that it could obtain.17 
																																																								
17 The original finding is reported in Fischoff (1975). Roese and Vohs (2012) provide 
a recent review of the findings. For a documentation of the hindsight bias as 
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Considered in the abstract, this might not be an unreasonable heuristic; 
absent better information, the fact that an event happens might be a good reason to 
judge it more likely than what one would otherwise think. The problem is that 
what matters for negligence attributions is ex ante, not ex post, foreseeability. That 
is, it matters whether at the time in which the agent acted and with the information 
she had, the likelihood of the bad consequences were low enough. Given this 
restriction, using information about the outcome obtaining to make this assessment 
is certainly a mistake.  
 
7. Lack of care vs. carelessness 
 
Negligence involves a failure of due care. Failing to care, as we have seen, excludes 
the intent or the active desire to breach some moral obligation. But that still leaves 
unresolved an ambiguity in the definition that needs to be cleared up. 
Corresponding to it, there is a third dimension of variation in negligent behavior 
worth taking into account.  
To see it, consider the following scenario: 
Groceries. Randy’s wife calls to ask if he can buy some groceries on the way 
back from work. She needs them for a party that she is hosting in the 
evening. Later that day, Randy takes the usual route planning to make the 
to stop at the store. On the way, however, he gets engrossed on his own 
thoughts and winds up driving straight home, inadvertently failing to make 
the stop. By the time he sees his wife and realizes it, the store is closed. 
(Modified from Murray et al 2018) 																																																																																																																																																																									
affecting judgments of negligence, see Kamin and Rachinsky (1995) and LaBine 
and Labine (1996). 
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Randy, we can stipulate, does not want to secretly spoil the dinner plans or to 
upset his wife He actually makes a plan to stop at the store and get the things his 
she asked for. But as the time approaches, his mind begins to be filled with 
thoughts about work. As a consequence, he inadvertently omits the stop and 
winds up driving straight home.  
Still, there various ways of understanding the omission, compatible with all 
the “facts” mentioned so far. First, perhaps Randy forgot to stop at the store 
because he did not care enough about the dinner his wife was hosting that evening. 
It is not necessary to assume here that he felt some sort of animosity toward the 
event or, for that matter, toward his wife. It is just that, as far as his priorities go, 
getting everything ready for the evening was not at the top of his list. That’s why 
he didn’t even think about it as he drove past the store. 
Another possibility is that Randy simply failed to exhibit how much he cared 
about it. Let’s suppose that he cared enough about the dinner, or at least that he 
cared as much as anyone normally cares about these things. Yet as soon as he got 
into his car and started driving on the familiar route, he automatically defaulted to 
the routine of driving straight back home. Whatever his attitudes were towards his 
wife’s dinner plans for that evening, they didn’t shape what he did. 
These ways of telling the story illustrate two ways in which a person’s 
behavior can be assessed as careless and, therefore, as negligent. Sometimes, what 
the person does is made careless by the motivational structure that brings it about. 
Her behavior, in those cases, reveals how the relevant attitudes that motivate her 
to act, comparatively speaking, fare with respect to each other. They reveal, for 
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instance, how little the person cares about dinner plans, or about pleasing his wife 
in comparison to what he cares about other things.    
 Other times, however, what the agent does is careless simply because her 
conduct fails to align with certain maxims of care of the sort that were mentioned 
above. In such cases, there might some attitude of the agent revealed by her actions 
or her omissions, say, a desire to get home and relax. Yet what she does is not a 
reflection of the balance of her motivations of the time. The agent had an intention to 
do something. She didn’t change her mind about it. But the intention slipped her 
mind and she wound up doing something else. 
 Slips of this sort are actually common in everyday life (Norman 1981; 
Reason 1984, Amaya 2013). Various factors potentially explain their occurrence. 
Described in terms of what the agent failed to do, they look like memory lapses: he 
forgot to pick up the groceries. Described in terms of what he did, they look 
instead like attentional captures: he was too distracted by his thoughts about work. 
Thus, one interesting hypothesis is that these slips are errors of vigilance (Amaya 
and Murray ms; Murray 2017). They result from the erroneous allocation of 
memory and attention necessary to implement plans of action with multiple 
interrelated goals (say, to think about work, while driving to the store, on one’s 
way back home).   
 Again, this psychological difference is morally significant. Various 
philosophers influenced by Kant have put forward attributionist proposals to 
explain why culpability is appropriate with respect to negligent agents of the sort 
that Randy illustrates (Arpaly 2003; Smith 2005; Sripada 2016). According them, 
judging these agents as culpable is warranted because their unwitting 
wrongdoings reveal a moral inappropriate valuation structure. They care too much 
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about things that they should not care. Or they care too little about things of 
considerable moral importance.  
Attribution is obviously close cousin of voluntarism. It is, at the very least, 
an attempt to vindicate the thesis that culpability is grounded on a guilty mind, in 
the light of the possibility inadvertent wrongdoing. The agent might not 
knowingly do something wrong. But the motivations on which she acts reflect 
something moral inappropriate about her structure of care.   
The problem, of course, is that attributions of this kind are of limited 
applicability. No doubt, there are cases in which people fail to do wrong without 
even noticing it because they do not care enough or they do not care about these 
things. The first interpretation of Randy’s case is an example. But, clearly, as 
Randy’s story under the second interpretation shows is that this is not always the 
case. In general, slips of this sort are evidence that the motivational force of an 
attitude and its power to influence one’s conduct at a time can come apart.18 
Inferring a guilty mind from the person’s conduct in these cases is, therefore, 
simply a bad inference. 
 
																																																								
18 It is often the case that these two aspects of our motivational states are treated as 
one and the same thing. Many actions theorists, for instance, hold the view that 
behavior, as economists would put it, “reveal preference”: one’s preference 
function is manifested in behavior (for discussions and criticisms of the view, see 
Amaya 2013). Some have thought that behind this, there is a psychological law: the 
so-called “law of desire” (see Clarke 1994 for discussion and examples). There are, 
however, also many theoretical models where the strength of a motivation and its 
power to influence behavior are clearly kept apart (for discussion of some of these 




Negligence is a morally significant phenomenon. It is a distinctive fact about a 
portion of our psychology and our social life that some forms of wrongdoing are 
conceptualized as negligent and that negligent actors are judged as culpable. 
Moreover, accounting for these attitudes requires discussing ideas that run deep 
through common ways of theorizing about moral responsibility. Given the many 
ways in which negligence obtains, it is hard to provide a unified account of the 
phenomenon.  
These two points, as mentioned at the outset, are intimately connected. The 
theoretical importance of negligence is, no doubt, underscored by its practical 
significance. Thus, at this point one might reasonably wonder whether the practice 
of holding people responsible for their negligent behavior can be legitimized at all. 
Is the lack of an overarching plausible theory a sign that some our practices need to 
be revised?19  
 It is possible, of course, that the lay and the experts got things wrong. 
Perhaps responsibility theorists have some prima facie methodological pressure to 
be conservative with respect to common intuitions and widespread practices. But 
those reasons can, obviously, be overridden. For instance, if these intuitions and 
practices are inconsistent with each other, it is clear that not all them can be 
coherently vindicated. Likewise, independent reasons for thinking that these 																																																								
19 Moore and Hurd (2011: 192), who are skeptics of negligence as a category of legal 
culpability, develop this line. In their opinion, negligence is something of a “dog’s 
breakfast”: a residual category whose members have nothing in common except 
that they do not belong to other categories.  
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intuitions and practices are the product of systematic error can make them lose 
their evidential credentials (for a thorough discussion of these issues, see Vargas 
2013, part 1).  
In line with this last point, some theorists have expressed skepticism about 
culpability for negligence (see, for instance, Levy 2017; Talbert 2017). Their 
hypothesis is that attributions of culpability based on it are the product of some 
systematic error in the form of a problematic inference. In brief, people witness an 
agent behaving in an inappropriate way or her action having morally objectionable 
consequences. And they infer from it that the agent acted with some reprehensible 
motive or out of some censurable attitude. 
This is an interesting hypothesis. If these theorists are right, negligence 
judgments results from an inappropriate inference from outcome to intent, in a 
way that make them highly-charged, psychologically speaking. More significantly, 
however, the hypothesis would provide an indirect vindication of the descriptive 
adequacy of the intuitions that initially recommended voluntarism as a theory of 
responsibility. People would make the problematic inference because, at least 
implicitly, they think moral responsibility is a matter of intent. 
Although this hypothesis, if true, would go a long way towards 
recommending skepticism, it is not clear that it is adequately supported. There is 
evidence, for instance, that human subjects tend to engage in reasoning about 
mental states when they are asked to produce judgments in response to morally 
charged actions and given no psychological information (for a review see Young 
and Tsoi 2013). But reasoning about mental states could be a matter of reasoning 
about the mental state that the person should have had, not about those that she 
actually has. 
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In fact, the evidence that we have runs in the direction opposite to the 
hypothesis. Subjects reliably describe some behavior as negligent and attribute 
culpability to their actors before learning whether their behavior had desirable 
consequences (Karlovac and Darley 1998). They hold on to judgments of 
culpability for negligent wrongdoing in the face of affirming that the actors didn’t 
know or believe they were doing wrong (Nuñez et al 2014, study 3; Kneer and 
Machery 2018, study 4a). Indeed, their attributions of culpability are unaffected by 
their explicit knowledge of absence of a desire to hurt or the presence an adequate 
attitude of care (Laurent et al 2016, experiment 2; Murray et al 2018).  
This is not to say that we should take common intuitions about concrete 
instances of negligence at face value. As we have seen, foreseeability judgments 
tend to be afflicted by the so-called “hindsight bias.” And some forms of 
assessment of negligent agents of the sort that attributionists recommend might be 
signs of a larger attribution error. None of this, however, shows what the skeptic 
needs as evidence to undermine the practices described here as products of a 
systematic error. We do make some systematic errors in attributing culpability to 
concrete negligent actors. But that falls short of showing that there is a systematic 




Throughout this chapter, I have emphasized how pervasive our practices are of 
holding people responsible for negligent wrongdoing. But it is important not to 
overstate this point. Ideally, we want a theory that account for our practices. But, 
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in reality, there are significant portions of our practices that we do not know well 
enough, let alone understand.    
As we have seen in the examples discussed here, concrete episodes of 
negligence can be interpreted in a variety of ways. So, whereas it is significant to 
note that people regularly find negligent agents culpable and even deserving of 
punishment, it is not entirely clear why they do so. This is, to be sure, a place 
where more work needs to be done. We need a diet of examples and scenarios that 
does a better job isolating the varieties of negligent wrongdoing. And we need to 
become more aware that even one scenario can be analyzed in multiple ways.  
Another thing not to overstate is the level of existing agreement. With 
respect to some episodes of negligence, anecdotally or by scientific probing of lay 
attitudes, we can be confident that there is a robust agreement regarding the 
culpability of the agent. But there are plenty of real life cases where people, lay and 
experts alike, do not seem to agree. And, for the most part, we have little idea how 
big is the variation and what accounts for it.   
 As an illustration, consider a case often mentioned in discussions of 
negligence. Every summer in the US approximately 30 toddlers die of 
hyperthermia after being inadvertently left in the backseat of the car (Weingarten 
2009; Amaya 2013). The stories are sadly similar. A parent leaves home planning to 
drop his child at day care on the way to work. But instead he winds up driving 
straight to the office, leaving the child in the hot car all day.  
 Despite being in the public eye since they increased in frequency after new 
child-seat laws were enacted in 1998, these slips keep on occurring with regularity 
every year. Importantly for present purposes, their puzzling incorrigibility 
correlates with wide variation in perceptions of responsibility. Public reactions to 
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them range from expressions of anger to sentiments of compassion and pity 
towards the parents. Legal precedence is all over the place. Some parents are never 
prosecuted; sentences for those who are prosecuted vary from one-year probation 
to 15 years in prison (Collins 2006).  
 No doubt, these episodes are real-life tragedies in need of a better 
explanation. We need to go beyond our usual stories about parents being too busy, 
too narrowly focused by work, etc (Amaya 2013, Amaya and Doris 2015). As we 
come to understand them more thoroughly, we also need to develop a better sense 
of what grounds the various responses that they generate. Perhaps people blame 
the parents because they think they didn’t care enough about their children. 
Maybe the tendency to exculpate them is explained by the thought that they have 
already suffered too much. At present we have some hypothesis. But we do not 




In this chapter, I have argued that negligence is a morally significant phenomenon. 
It plays an important role in shaping up familiar ways in which moral evaluation 
takes place. It challenges widespread assumptions about the domain and the 
grounds for moral culpability. Trying to account for it, some promising avenues of 
moral theorizing are shown to be more problematic than they otherwise seemed.  
In way, this is not an uplifting result. As it is has becomes apparent, we do 
not have yet a fully developed moral psychology of negligence. Concerning many of 
the core issues raised by it, there is more disagreement than consensus. Solving the 
disagreement often requires more evidence than we have in hand. But looking at 
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the elements of the problem gathered here, does serve to show that developing a 
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